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Abstract 
We begin with the observation that some Korean elementary school children in English class, confined to a single 
situation and even a single language exponent in a role play, appear to produce far more coherent dialogue than the 
previous week when they were allowed completely free choices in language. We note that at the same time as their 
dialogue becomes longer, their sentences become shorter (tall and thinner on the printed page), and we suggest that 
the grammatical complexity is consciously unpacked as discourse complexity. When we turn to a large corpus of 
longitudinal and cross sectional data, we see, however, that “thinner” dialogue with short utterances is not always 
more creative, at least not grammatically. We see that the children are deliberately and consciously choosing more 
elliptical and less creative expressions when they speak. We generalize from this data to show that the problem is no 
mere artifact of the data sample. We theorize from this generalization to show that the development of the child’s free 
will in syntax is related to a long chain of such constraints, leading from instincts to habits to intelligent choices 
oriented toward the immediate environment to acts of free will which are genuinely voluntary and which admit no 
sovereign but the child’s developing self. Indeed, we shall argue that the exercise of this sovereignty is precisely how 
the child develops a self in the first place. 
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Our problem, even if it were not very familiar to teachers already, is easily stated in numbers. We 
take an English book from a Korean classroom. We divide each dialogue into “utterances”, defined, as 
Bakhtin would define them, as the stretches of dialogue between the moments when the speaker 
becomes the hearer (1986, p. 63). We then count the number of words in each utterance, and we find 
that the mean length of the utterance in each lesson increases on the average .5 words per year, from 3.2 
words per utterance in Third Grade to 4.0 words per utterance in Fifth Grade. Yet when we actually talk to 
the children, we find a curious paradox. On the one hand, they grow more and more reliant on the 
textbook for fixed phrases as they age. This ought to make their utterances longer and longer. But on the 
other, we find them growing more and more laconic in replies. In some cases, syntax disappears, and the 
child will say very little beyond “yes”, “no” and perhaps “fine-thanks-and-how-are-you”. 
In this paper, we shall explain this paradox and consider some solutions to this problem of 
disappearing syntax. We begin with two short extracts that show the children using “free choices” in 
improvising a dialogue and “forced choices” where they are constrained to use a single setting, a single 
set of characters, and even a single communicative function. In the former extract, the children do little 
but remember, and remember little but titles of lessons and other fixed phrases from their textbook. In the 
latter, there is much more creativity and imagination—but there are also much shorter and less accurate 
utterances. So, as we shall see, the solution to the problem of disappearing syntax cannot simply be 
more freedom of choice—there must, instead, be a concerted effort to seize power over the very system 
of constraint.  
A One-Week Miracle? 
Consider the following class of children studying English in third grade in a Seoul public school. 
Two forty-minute lessons a week are required by the state syllabus, which at the time that the data was 
gathered, also designated a single textbook for the whole country, with an accompanying manual 
stipulating how lessons are to be conducted. Each lesson has a graduated set of activities from “Look and 
Listen”, to “Listen and Repeat”, to “Let’s Sing/Chant”, culminating in “Let’s Play” (usually a rule based 
game) or “Let’s Role Play” (based on an imaginary situation).  
The activity from which the data is drawn is a combination of the last two. The children are placed 
into teams, and the teacher places an imaginary volleyball net down the middle of the class. Each 
"volleyball team” takes on an imaginary persona from the textbook, and they take turns volunteering 
utterances, which are then written, by the teacher, on the board. Teams score points when the other team 
makes an error or when the other team “drops the ball” by not being able to come up with a rejoinder 
before the count of three (for more details on this game, see Kwon and Kellogg, 2005).  
Here, the team names are “Minsu” and “Mina”, two Korean siblings from the “Look and Listen” 
exercise in the textbook. The children are completely free to use any language they know, and they can 
make up the content of the imaginary characters as they go along. The lesson is recorded using a voice 
recorder carried by the teacher, and the white board is photographed using a digital camera after it is 
filled up. 
Minsu: Can you fly? 
Mina: No, I can’t. 
Minsu: Can you skate? 
Mina: No, I can't. 
Minsu: What time is it? 
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Mina: It's eleven twenty five. 
Minsu: How many cow? (sic) 
Mina: Two cow. 
Minsu: How old are you? 
Mina: I'm ten.  
Minsu: What day is it? 
Mina: Tuesday. 
Minsu: Can you ski? 
Mina: Yes, I can. (Data from Ms. Yun Huijeong) 
Why doesn’t Minsu know how old his sister is? Why, for that matter, doesn’t he know whether or 
not his sister can skate or fly? The apparently mysterious lack of sibling familiarity is easy to explain. 
What the children are really doing is neither playing a game nor doing a role play, but reciting the titles 
and kernel dialogues of almost all of their previous lessons and some of the upcoming ones: “How many 
cows?”, “How old are you?”, “What time is it?”, and the lesson of the week, which is “Can you swim?” 
Now consider the following, recorded just one week later. Here the children are forced to use a 
single situation (the week’s lesson) and even a single language exponent (“Put on your [article of 
clothing]”). On the other hand, they have been given more discretion in determining the roles. So they 
have decided that Minsu is an older brother rather than a younger one, and that Mina, the little sister, is 
attracted to a boy in her class and wants to show off how slim she is. Minsu, already somewhat inclined to 
sartorial conservatism and somewhat protective, would rather she cover up. 
Minsu: Put on your coat. 
Mina: No.  
Minsu: Outside, cold! (i.e. “It’s cold outside.”) 
Mina: No!  
Minsu: What!  
Mina: I'm sorry.  
Minsu: Put on your glove. (sic) 
Mina: Yes.  
Minsu: Put on your cap.  
Mina: Too big.  
Minsu: Put on your sweater.  
Mina: Too small.  
Minsu (holding up a beautiful scarf): Put on your scarf. 
Mina: Yes, please!  
Minsu: Put on your pants.  
Mina: No, I'm skirt. (i.e. “I want to wear a skirt.”) 
Minsu: You, inside, play! (i.e. “You must stay inside and play and cannot go out.”) 
Mina: No!  
(Data from Ms. Yun Huijeong) 
The incoherence has all but disappeared. Every utterance now appears well motivated and 
contributes to the developing imaginary situation: at each point it is clear who is saying what to whom and 
why. We can’t attribute this to a miraculous one week increase in English proficiency—not least because 
a lot of the grammatical well-formedness has disappeared along with the pointlessness. What appears to 
have occurred is in some ways far more miraculous: Instead of precision and grammatical accuracy (“It’s 
eleven twenty-five”) we have relevance and cogency (“Outside, cold!”). Where once there was clausal 
elaboration (“How old are you?”), we now have what Vygotsky would call purely predicative speech (“Too 
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small!”). Negation plays a less prominent grammatical but a more prominent pragmatic role (“No!” in lieu 
of “No, I can’t”).  
In sum, the sentences have become shorter and the dialogue itself has become longer—that is, 
the intra-utterance grammatical complexity, which was never fully internalized by the children as meaning, 
has been unpacked as inter-utterance discourse complexity. Only then can it be folded back into 
wordings and even sound that are meaningful to the child, and only when this has been done can the 
wording and sounding be taken for granted, and the whole episode compressed into the now verbalized 
word meaning “Put on your….” We may easily imagine that henceforth the child’s inner voice may lend a 
somewhat gruff note to this particular utterance. 
The Problem of Disappearing Syntax 
Alongside this beautiful picture of the unpacking of meaning as dialogue, we need to look at some 
baffling, and even terrifying, statistics. We collected texts created by students when they improvised 
(totaling 1,745 turns) and compared them with the texts created when they simply repeated textbook 
dialogues (totaling 399 turns). Consent was obtained and data duly recorded from third, fourth, and fifth 
grade classes for comparison, and then data was taken from every fifth grade class for a whole year. The 
data was then transcribed. Using a t-test, we found that the textbook dialogues tended to have longer 
utterances (a mean of 3.6792 words vs. 2.8487 for the improvised dialogues, significant at the level p < 
.001). Improvised dialogues, on the other hand, had a significantly higher proportion of closed class 
functor words (e.g. “this” and “your”) to total words (“Is this your cap?”). This difference (.6224 vs. .5876) 
was also significant at the p < .05 level. Cohen’s d was 0.30703, which is considered a small or medium 
effect size. The table below shows the mean length in words per utterance and the standard deviations by 
grade (df = 398). 
Table 1 
GRADE Mean Length in Words per Utterance N Standard Deviation 
3 3.1705 346 1.1831 
4 2.8828 273 1.4249 
5 2.7416 1126 1.5921 
(Data courtesy of Ms. Yun Huijeong, gathered in the years 2007-2009). 
 
We now return to the transcripts with a qualitative eye. In our subsequent discussion of the 
transcripts, we take as our definition of “creativity” the ability to say things that the child has never heard 
before: creative utterances are utterances, which do not appear in the textbook or in the recorded 
transcript of the lesson.  
We immediately notice that there is a decrease in the kind of variations on the textbook language 
and creative constructions that we saw in our second dialogue above and that the children become 
increasingly reliant upon the fixed expressions taken straight from the book that we saw in the first 
dialogue. But this seems highly contradictory. Since the children are using more fixed expressions from 
the book, and the fixed expressions are growing longer from year to year, shouldn’t the children’s 
sentences be growing?  
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To resolve this apparent paradox, let us begin by simply trying to describe it more precisely than 
simply calling utterances either “creative” or “uncreative”. At the beginning of the very first dialogue, we 
saw that the children appear to be repeating whole lesson titles word for word. The first two utterances 
are the title of the week’s lesson and the response that the children have been taught. 
Minsu: Can you fly? (Lesson Seven) 
Mina: No, I can't. (Lesson Seven) 
Following Tomasello’s work in first language learning (2003), we might call this use of whole 
utterances “fixed expressions”, though of course we must alter the meaning of the category to fit this 
foreign language learning context. In this context, we use “fixed expressions” to mean expressions that 
appear literally, word for word, in the textbook; the child takes them over as they are without changing a 
single word.  
The next two expressions are a little different: 
Minsu: Can you skate? 
Mina: No, I can’t.  
Although “Can you swim?” appears in the textbook, there is no use of “Can you skate?” We will 
call this repetition of a fixed expression with one point of variation an “item-based combination”. While 
“No, I can’t” appears in the textbook, it is in the context of swimming and not in the context of skating. So 
we can see that there is one point of variation. Tomasello (2005) notes that such half-fixed and half-free 
expressions are a very important step, at least in first language learning. But he also notes that they are 
limited. Because variation only takes place at a single node, the child can only say things like “Put on your 
shoes” and not “Take off your gloves”. These expressions do not generalize to become a system, and 
that is why he refers to them as “developmental islands”.  
Viewed qualitatively, we see that our first dialogue contains only fixed expressions and item-
based combinations. However, our second dialogue contains four expressions which are neither fixed 
expressions nor item-based constructions, namely, “What!”, “No, I’m scarf”, “Outside, cold!” and “You, 
inside, play!” Of course, on some level, these are just variations too: “What!” is a variation on “What’s 
this?” “No, I’m scarf” is a variation on “No, I can’t” and perhaps also “I’m sorry”, “Outside, cold” might 
come from “Let’s go outside” and “It’s cold”, both of which appear in the lesson, and of course “You, 
inside, play!” is a funny twist on “outside, cold!” But they are larger, freer variations, involving more than 
one node of variation. So, again following Tomasello’s work in first language acquisition, we will call these 
apparently original utterances “abstract constructions”.  
Of course, they are not necessarily abstract in their origins. The creation of a completely original 
construction by multiple transformations from a memorized chunk of language is possible, and this may 
indeed be the mechanism by which some abstract constructions might first arise. But when a child says 
“What!” instead of “What’s this?” there is potentially more than mere generalization: there are (at least) 
two acts of abstraction. First of all, the child is abstracting away the verb phrase “is this”, turning a full 
clause into a minor clause. Secondly, the child is abstracting away intonation as a separate quality, and 
this act of abstraction allows the child to turn “What’s this?” which canonically has a sharply rising (what 
Halliday and Greaves, 2008 call Tone 2) into “What!” which has a falling, downward intonation (what 
Halliday and Greaves term Tone 1). This tonal difference turns a question into an indignant exclamation—
it is an instance of interpersonal metaphor, like the use of a question like “May I have your attention 
please?” as a command, except in this case it is rather the other way around. Here the child has created 
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a system of intonation which will eventually correspond to the lexicogrammatical difference between an 
interrogative and an exclamative (for an interesting account of how this might take place in first language 
learning, see Halliday, 2004, p. 44). 
Similarly, when the child creates “”No, I’m scarf” from “No, I can’t” and “I’m sorry” (if that is how it 
is indeed created), we have at least potentially more than a set of concrete generalizations. First of all, 
the child abstracts away “No” from its position as modal adjunct in “No, I can’t”. Secondly the child 
abstracts away “sorry” and replaces it with a noun, and to do this the child must also get rid of an article 
“a” on the noun “scarf”. When the child creates “Outside, cold!” from “Let’s go outside” and “It’s cold” the 
child is not simply eliding “Let’s go” and “it’s”, the child is also moving “Outside” to what Halliday would 
call the Thematic position at the beginning of the sentence and giving “cold” the status of Rheme, or 
comment (see Halliday 2014, pp. 88-92 for more details on Theme and Rheme). As these examples 
above indicate, they appear to have their own grammar, and involve some abstract notion of “subject”, 
“verb”, or “object”, or a formula with at least two variables (e.g. “X is Y”).  
Of course, one could argue—and many linguists will argue—that this is not abstraction but merely 
elision, and that the result is not a construction but an omission. But this argument assumes that what the 
child is in the business of constructing is some replica of the adult language. As Halliday points out (2004, 
p. 29), this is not necessarily the case. What seems much more probable is that replication of the adult 
language is (as we can see in the fixed expressions and item-based combinations) a subordinate part of 
a much wider enterprise, namely learning how to mean. 
This gives us three categories with which to analyze a larger data base—fixed expressions, item-
based combinations, and creative abstract constructions. Our data base is somewhat slanted towards 
fifth graders, because we collected data every lesson in fifth grade for a whole year in order to see if there 
was any longitudinal change in the proportions of fixed expressions, item-based combinations, and 
abstract constructions (there was not). The major categories of interest are given first, followed by 
“incoherent” contributions which did not make sense and which were ruled out of the game (e.g. “How old 
are you?” between siblings, already discussed above), “indexical” expressions (mostly “Wow” or “Ha ha!”) 
and “precocious” expressions apparently mined from future lessons in the textbook by hardworking 
students looking ahead. Here is a breakdown of the data base by grade. 
Table 2 
Grade Form Utterances Percentage 
3 Fixed Expression 163 47.1% 
 Item-based Combination 109 31.5% 
 Creative Abstract Construction 30 8.7% 
 Incoherent 11 3.2% 
 Indexical 2 .6% 
 Korean 7 2.0% 
 Precocious 24 6.9% 
 Total 346 100.0% 
 
4 Fixed Expression 149 54.6% 
 Item-based Combination 48 17.6% 
 Creative Abstract Construction 40 14.7% 
 Incoherent 3 1.1% 
 Indexical 1 .4% 
 Precocious 32 11.7% 
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 Total 273 100.0% 
 
5 Fixed Expression 767 68.1% 
 Item-based Combination 124 11.0% 
 Creative Abstract Construction 148 13.1% 
 Incoherent 3 .3% 
 Indexical 11 1.0% 
 Korean 2 .2% 
 Precocious 71 6.3% 
 Total 1126 100.0% 
 
As can be seen, the incoherent sentences almost disappear in fourth grade, and so does Korean. 
But fixed expressions do not; proportionally, they increase rather than decrease, while creative 
constructions increase from third to fourth grade and then stabilize at about fourteen percent of total 
utterances. The proportion of item-based combinations declines from nearly a third to under eighteen 
percent in fourth grade and only eleven percent by fifth. The non-existence of Korean in fourth grade is 
probably due to the small sample. But we have our paradox: shorter sentences, on the one hand, and 
more fixed expressions on the other. If the children are adhering more closely to the book, and the 
utterances in the book are growing longer from year to year, why are the children’s utterances growing 
shorter?  
We can explain the paradox of shorter sentences and more fixed expressions quite easily when 
we look at the most common expressions that the children use in the course of the game, broken down 
by grade. (See appendix.) As the children age, they appear to favor shorter and simpler fixed expressions 
rather than longer and more complex creative constructions. It seems that they have learned to pursue a 
fairly conservative strategy, which is, from the point of view grammatical complexity, not very 
developmental.  
Now, it might appear, at first glance, that this conservative, non-developmental strategy is simply 
an artifact of the game itself, since creative constructions frequently contain errors and these are 
penalized by the rules of the game. There are two reasons why we doubt this. First of all, if the children 
were simply responding to learning the rules of the game, we would expect to see a significant change as 
soon as the children realize that creative constructions often lead to errors and to losing the point. With 
data gathered over a whole year’s time, we should observe a major change. But we observed no 
significant change in the fifth grade data that we gathered every week from March until December. 
Secondly, if the shortening of the utterances was simply a result of the rules of the game then we would 
expect that the children would go for fixed expressions first—since they are always error free and only 
resort to an item-based combination when there is no fixed expression that fits. We would also expect 
that the children would choose item-based combinations before abstract constructions and only resort to 
the latter when they cannot think of an item-based combination. 
This is not what we observe. We number the contributions that the children make from one to 
fourteen, which is the maximum number of utterances in a dialogue, due to the way the game is 
structured with the teacher recording utterances on a whiteboard. We then calculate the mean utterance 
of emergence for each type of expression. This produces a rather surprising result. In spite of the fact that 
the children are forced, by the rules of the game, to begin with at least one fixed expression from the 
textbook (because the exercise is one of dialogue continuation rather than complete improvisation), we 
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find that item-based combinations appear, on the average, somewhat earlier than fixed expressions; the 
children do appear to be more eager to use them. 
Table 3 
Form Mean utterance of emergence Standard deviation 
Fixed expressions 9.21 6.28 
Item-based combinations 8.61 6.42 
Abstract constructions  13.84 7.83 
 
According to the t-test, the difference between the mean turn of the fixed expression and the 
item-based combinations is not significant (p > .1), but that between the fixed expressions and the 
abstract constructions is statistically significant at p < .001. Abstract constructions, therefore, do tend to 
occur significantly later in the improvisation. It appears that while children tend to only resort to creative 
constructions under pressure and at the very end of the game, they actually tend to use item-based 
combinations at the same time or even before they employ fixed expressions.  
So a better explanation for our paradox of greater reliance on fixed expressions and shrinking 
sentences is this: the shortening sentences are actually the result of the growing volitional control that we 
see as the child goes from Tomasello’s “fixed expressions” to his “creative abstract constructions”. But 
why would this growing volitional control result in shorter sentences year after year? 
One possible explanation is this. The influence of standardized examinations grows stronger and 
stronger as the child matures, and these tests reward short answers that are 100% accurate. Longer, 
more creative answers are far less likely to be error-free, and are therefore not the optimal choice for the 
child. Of course, in the long run, this is a disastrous choice for everybody. Since we cannot seriously 
expect children to operate in English with a repertoire of less than a thousand words and only a few 
hundred basic sentence patterns, our pedagogy may be punishing precisely the item-based combinations 
and the abstract creative constructions that will be most useful in the wide world outside the classroom. 
Local Solutions: Complexity Out of Rebellion 
Korea has a highly centralized educational system which is remarkable impervious to learner 
needs, teacher demands, empirical research, and sometimes even simple logic (during a heady few 
months early in the reign of the previous president, it was announced that English would become an 
official language and all secondary education would be conducted in that medium; this was halted only 
when it was abruptly realized that nobody would be able to understand anything!).  
So it would be otiose to propose curricular change in this paper. Yet we cannot help but note that 
there are quite simple solutions to the problem of disappearing syntax that emerge on the margins of the 
data itself, and whose origins lie precisely in the kinds of rebellious, dispreferred responses that the 
children seem to prefer. Dispreferred responses—that is, responses which are unexpected in some way 
and need to be accounted for—do tend to be longer and more complex in themselves and require follow 
ups in ways that preferred responses—that is, responses which are expected and therefore not worth 
accounting for—do not. (For example, the dispreferred response “Terrible” in response to “How are you?” 
requires following up in a way that the preferred response “Fine” does not.) 
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There are six examples of abstract constructions containing more than one verb, of which two 
involve subordination (the others are compound sentences constructed using “and” or “but”). Let’s look at 
them. Here Julie is arguing with a talking puppy that has wet her dress: 
 
Puppy’s Team: Let's go home. 
Julie’s Team: I cannot go home! 
Puppy’s Team: No, go! 
Julie’s Team: No. 
Puppy’s Team: Go, go, go! 
Julie’s Team: I cannot go home. 
Puppy’s Team: Why? 
Julie’s Team: I cannot go home because I'm hungry. 
The complex final sentence emerges from the joint elaboration of the word “No!” 
What happens when the children do not give a negative response, but instead simply refuse to 
hear the suggestion? Here one team is playing Mrs. Smith, the teacher, who attempts to detain Jinho. 
Jinho has a cold and is fleeing to the doctor’s office. 
Jinho’s Team: Bye, Mrs. Smith. 
Mrs. Smith’s Team: Wait, Jinho. 
Jinho’s Team: What? 
Mrs. Smith’s Team: I says 'Wait'.  
 
Our first example of reported speech! Again, it happens because the children are elaborating a 
dispreferred response. And once again we see that the complexity is a joint construction, not exactly 
collaborative since it is founded in negation, but certainly highly interactive.  
Naturally, moments like these are far from typical, but for that very reason we may suppose that 
they lie on the cutting edge of the child’s development. In next section of this paper, we wish to consider 
what it is that is developing and how. 
Forced Choices, Free Choices 
Traditionally, the development of fluency in a foreign language has been conceptualized in one of 
two ways: either as the unfolding of the same completely natural “language instinct” that was 
hypothesized by nativists for first language acquisition (Pinker, 1994) or as the entrainment of habits of 
behavior, subject to power laws of practice (see especially the work of Nick Ellis, 2002). These two 
traditional ways have largely defined the discussion of child foreign language learning, even when the 
century-long marriage of structuralism and behaviorism that followed upon the “Reform” movement of the 
1870s fell apart (for an excellent discussion, see A.P.R. Howatt, 1984, pp. 212-228). On one side of the 
Atlantic, a form of communicative teaching based on structuralism and the innatist ideas of Chomsky 
developed (e.g. Dulay, Burt, & Krashen, 1982). On the other, a form of teaching also called 
“communicative” developed along the lines of “Can Do” specifications and behavioral bands (e.g. Council 
of Europe, 2001, p. 24).  
Little noticed, alongside these traditional ways of regarding what the children are doing in our 
data as either the unfolding of a natural process or the entrainment of cultural habits, a third choice 
emerged, that of Halliday’s systemic-functional grammar (Halliday with Matthiessen, 2014). In a systemic-
Forced Choices: Role play and the problem of disappearing syntax  





Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http:dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2014.65  |  Vol. 2 (2014) 
 
A10 
functional grammar, we understand the data as reflective of sets of choices from a fairly narrow “menu”, 
called a system network. For example, when the child seeks to interact in a role play, the child chooses 
between talking and acting (or between exchanges of information and exchanges of goods and services). 
If the child chooses to talk, he or she faces a choice between giving information (canonically by making 
declarative statements) or getting it (through interrogatives), and if the child chooses to get information, 
the child then has a choice between asking about polarity (yes-no questions) or requesting missing 
information (wh-questions). Similar systems networks have been worked out for transitivity structures 
(that is, material, mental, verbal, and relational processes enacted by the verb and its companions and 
circumstances) and even for the ordering of elements in a message (that is, their ordering from a Theme 
that represents the speaker’s point of view to a Rheme that represents the hearer-orientation of the 
message).  
But these choices are neither natural nor entrained. They are made quite consciously and 
deliberately, even creatively, as we see in the “forced choices” of our data. They are then refined, 
particularly as the child compares them with data in the immediate cultural environment, and it is only 
here that the “Can Do” descriptors beloved of social-behaviorist approaches become at all relevant, 
creating solutions, which are intelligent, but no longer novel. 
The basic contradiction is this. On the one hand, creativity is not creativity if it comes from outside 
the child—as we’ve seen, the “Fixed Expressions” are merely rote repetitions, word for word, from 
textbook materials, and they are worlds away, structurally, functionally and genetically, from creative 
abstract constructions. On the other, to ascribe creativity to some inner pre-existing inner creative force is 
essentially circular: we are explaining creativity by some innate form of creativity, some essentially 
homuncular form of free will that exists at birth or even before.  
In order to trace the true history of creativity in a non-tautological way we must necessarily begin 
with something that is not creativity. But for Vygotsky, that something is not imitation—or rather, not only 
imitation—but rather constraint. It is true that initially the constraints do come from the environment; the 
child is dependent on others for food, warmth, and even transportation, and it is in this way that the child’s 
pragmatic use of language is constructed (Halliday 2004, p. 23). But that is really only half the story; in 
addition to the pragmatic use of language, the child is reflecting upon and construing representations of 
his or her own needs, the affordances in her or his environment, and relations between objects and 
events.  
This function, which is not strictly pragmatic, is what Halliday (2004) terms the “mathetic” function. 
Initially, it simply allows the child a different way of acting on the environment, because the child’s 
utterances, instead of being directed only to others, can be self-directed and can take on a planning 
function instead (Выготский, 1983, p. 268). But like many new functions (indeed, like the pragmatic 
function of language which was taken over for mathetic purposes) this new mathetic function does not 
simply follow along, adapting to reality like an instinct or a habit. This function is capable of anticipating, 
evading, and even changing reality; it is what makes possible the child’s construction of imaginary worlds, 
one of whose denizens is the child’s own idealized behavior, and even the child’s sense of self. This is, in 
turn, exactly how Vygotsky resolves the great paradox: how we can teach creativity through imitation (or, 
to take an example from moral/ethical education, how we can teach free behavior through telling other 
people what to do)?  
We don’t. Instead, what happens is the kind of rebellion that we saw in our data. The child takes 
control of the means of creativity (or the means of telling other people what to do) and wields them for her 
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or his own purposes. These purposes are often quite different from the purposes others may have in 
teaching the child but which can nevertheless be guided by others through the artificial culture we call 
play. This guidance cannot, however, take place exclusively through imitation, e.g. the replication of fixed 
expressions.  
First of all, as Vygotsky knew, intelligent imitation even in animals requires that the imitator share 
the goal of the imitated (Выготский, 1983, p. 131), and when children seize control of the means of 
creativity they do so for their own purposes and not for the teacher's (e.g. they do so in order to win the 
game and defeat the other team and not in order to develop their grammar). Secondly, as every child 
knows, a slavish imitator may be able to play the game but the real goal is not simply to play but to win, 
and winning a game necessarily involves doing something differently from the loser. The process of 
developing free will (in language, in art, and even in moral decision making) has certain stages, each of 
which is divided from the previous stage by a process of selection. It is only at the very bottom of this 
process, in natural responses and conditioned habits, that we can really talk of natural, that is, unfree 
selection, viz. constraint. Yet it is precisely on the basis of these unfree selections that higher, freer 
selections can arise.   
When a child, for example stands up for another child being bullied on the playground, we cannot 
say that the child is obeying instinct—because instinct would make the child run away. Nor can we call 
this a habit; it may go directly against the grain of getting along with others and avoiding trouble. We 
cannot say it is intelligent either; the risks are high and the chance of any payoff quite low. What we have 
to say is that this is an act of free will. 
In ontogenetic terms, at least for the first language, development appears to be largely from the 
bottom up: the child is born into a semiotic world of natural responses (tears and laughter), which provide 
the raw material for the conditioned habits of early language: But as Halliday (2004) describes the 
process, it is neither instinct nor adaptation to the external environment that enables this to happen; the 
child does not unfold a pre-made sound system or imitate a ready-made one from the environment but 
instead constructs his or her own “child tongue”: the naseopharyngealized vowels of crying, for example, 
become differentiated into vowels on the one hand and consonants on the other, and the prosodics of 
natural cries become differentiated into the rising intonation of the pragmatic request and the falling 
intonation of the mathetic statement (Halliday, 2004, p. 145). As the child breaks into lexicogrammar, 
imitation as a strategy fails even more spectacularly; the utterances the child wants are never the ones 
that he or she hears or hears and remembers, and only intelligence can help the child in each novel 
pragmatic situation. Finally, with the mathetic function, we have the ontogenesis of the imaginary situation 
and of the imaginary self (for the self, like any other meaning-made thing, can neither be inherited nor 
imitated; it can only be imagined).  
These ontogenetic moments in Halliday’s account of language construction have equivalents in 
our microgenetic (Halliday would say logogenetic) data. The natural basis of language is highly 
conspicuous in the form of the “indexical” expressions (e.g. “Wow!” “Aha!” “Oh!”, “Ha ha!” etc.) and above 
all in the form of laughter. Alongside the sounds of the mother tongue, by now acquired as conditioned 
habits, laughing, squealing, shouting and shrieking provide the stuff of English prosodics, the intonational 
tunes which the children use to animate the rote, fixed expressions from the textbook. But just as instinct 
and even habit failed the child in the acquisition of fixed expressions (English habits are not at all like 
Korean ones), the imitation of fixed expressions in turn fails the child in the game. 
Forced Choices: Role play and the problem of disappearing syntax  
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Borrowing a little from Abraham Maslow’s famous “pyramid of needs” (1943), we might portray 
the Vygotskyan view of what is happening in our data something like this:  
 
In order to create a coherent dialogue, the Minsu team and the Mina team cannot rely on the 
conditioned habits memorized from previous and subsequent lesson titles in the book. They must, 
instead, re-invent the imaginary situation in the book: Mina is now a frolicsome younger sister and Minsu 
is now an older brother, very conservative and all too familiar with his sibling’s flirtatious ways. This 
imaginary situation is undoubtedly based on the characters, the situation, and even the specific language 
(“Put on your ....”) that we find in the textbook; but it cannot be said to be a conditioned habit; since the 
specific problem is novel. By reimagining the characters the children have created a problem that cannot 
solved by rote methods and instead requires, at the very least, the use of item-based combination (“Put 
on your coat/glove/cap/sweater/scarf/pants!”). The other team is now confronted with one item-based 
combination after another. Because her negative response is repeated, it can be truncated (not “No, I 
won’t” but simply “No!”). But nay-saying is a passive exercise that ill suits the vivacious character Mina, 
and she begins to give reasons for her refusal (“Too small”, “too big”). She even responds to the beautiful 
scarf with an enthusiastic “Yes, please!”, which is hardly an example of truncation. But none of this allows 
her what she really wants from the dialogue, which is the opportunity to show off her attractive legs. Only 
the creative abstract construction “No, I’m skirt” has the power to do this.  
“No, I’m skirt” is of course not a habit; still less is it an instinct. But it is also not exactly an 
“intelligent” solution. First of all, it’s not economical; a fixed “No!” would suffice and an item-based 
combination like “I don’t like pants” could be reused in subsequent utterances (and, as we’ve seen, 
economical solutions like these do account for the problem of disappearing syntax). Secondly, it’s not 
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adaptative: the chance of error is high (and in fact Mina does make an error which, if the teacher were not 
enjoying the repartee so much, would put an end to the game and award the other side a point). Thirdly, it 
is not strategic; it lays Mina open to a very simple follow-up “Why?” which would require some difficult 
explaining (and in fact the children often do use “Why?” or “Why not?” as a way of “spiking” in this game 
of verbal volleyball, precisely because it requires a full clause in reply). What we have to say is that “No, 
I’m skirt” is not only a creative abstract construction, in that it has its own model of a grammar that is quite 
different from English grammar, but also an act of free will. More, what we may say is that this act of free 
will emerges precisely out of the forced choices imposed on poor Mina by her tyrannical brother and by 
the difficult language game she is learning to play with such creativity and with such imagination.  
In his book “The History of the Development of the Higher Psychological Functions”, recently 
translated into Korean as 어린의	  자기행동	  숙달의	  역사와	  발달 (‘History and Development in the Child’s 
Self-mastery of Behavior”, 비고츠키, 2013, 2014), Vygotsky presents a series of experiments in which the 
child is given a long list of words to memorize. The child is offered a set of pictures, which may offer some 
kind of mnemonic structure. Some of the mnemonic structures are quite obvious (e.g. a picture of a camel 
will help the child remember the noun “death”, and a picture of a lion will help the child remember the 
word “shoot”). When the child is given a “free choice” of pictures, these are the choices that the child 
appears inclined to make. But in other cases the child is forced to create his or her own mnemonic 
structure (e.g. the child must use a picture of a crab in order to remember the word “theatre”). In these 
cases, Vygotsky discovers, children can come up with highly innovative structures (e.g. the child imagines 
the crab admiring beautiful stones at the bottom of the sea as if at the theatre) and these turn out to be 
more durable—and even more efficient in recovering the precise word—than the more conventional sort 
(Выготский, 1983, p. 242). 
Vygotsky explains. The “free choice” offered the child is in fact not free at all; the child is only 
given a menu of conventional associations from which to choose. The story of the camel’s death and the 
shooting of the lion are not the child’s stories but only linguistic habits recollected from other stories. In 
contrast, the choice forced upon the child is truly free: the child can create his or her own mnemonic link. 
The story of the crab’s theatre is a story, which the child freely made up, and so the link between the crab 
and the theatre gives the child a more active form of remembering. It seems plausible that this more 
active form of remembering is agnatic to the kind of linguistic creativity we see when the children in our 
data are forced to use a single structure such as “Put on your…” rather than given a free choice of 
structures from which to choose, and when they respond by experimentally enacting an internal function, 
in this case the pragmatic use of the language, as an experimental drama between imaginary people. 
A final, somewhat self-reflexive note: this paper has, in the course of the normal process of peer 
review at this journal, passed through many forced choices, some of which were voluntarily undertaken, 
and some of which were made under pressure from the editors. For example, in their lengthy decision 
over-ruling the majority of the reviewers and rejecting this manuscript, the managing editors insisted that 
“the whole ‘fun’ of play lies in the fact that the rules that are upheld are devised by the players.”2 Since the 
                                                       
2 Editors' Note: The above is a quote from my (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) editorial comments on the margins of the manuscript (draft 
#1), dated 2014-02-28. The full comment reads: “Hm, The term ‘forced’ is problematic for me here – because it usually implies force 
that comes not from intrinsic motivation but an outside force. However, the whole ‘fun’ of play is in the fact that the rules that 
are upheld are devised by the players. Yes, there is a fact that each situation ‘affords’ some and does not ‘afford’ other patterns of 
behavior and decision (Gibson), but since in play, these situations are imaginary, the ‘affordance’ is not quite ‘forced’ – what do you 
think? ... So in itself, to say ‘forced’ is a particular interpretation of what play means – and it might be great for you to discuss it – 
since you are using it in that way. Otherwise, it is not quite justified, from our point of view.”  
Thoughts expressed in that remark, were finalized in the following paragraph in the Editorial decision dated 2014-02-28: “Another 
concept that we find very promising is the concept of the tension between what you call ‘forced choices’ afforded by the context of 
an imagined situation (as in Gibson's view of affordance) on one side; and on the other, the feeling of freedom that makes play so 
Forced Choices: Role play and the problem of disappearing syntax  
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rules of this game were not devised by the players but rather by the author, this would suggest that the 
play was not fun, something that is really at variance with the fact that the game continued to be 
demanded by the children in every single lesson for the rest of the year. In their second, conditional 
acceptance of this paper, the editors wrote that our analysis of the data has tended to obscure “the 
feeling of freedom that makes play so appealing to the players”.3 It appears, therefore, that the editors 
would like us to emphasize the “free” in free will: that it is freedom which makes play attractive to the 
players.  
This recommendation is marked “optional” by the managing editors, which has the unfortunate 
effect of making all of their other recommendations appear binding. But this optional recommendation 
seems unwarranted to us: it seems to us more likely that it is the “will” in free will that motivates the 
children; it is the skillful exercise of will which allows them to win the game. We saw that in the first data 
extract, when the children were absolutely free to choose any language they knew and when they were 
able to build up the characters and the situation as they went along, the game was nonsensical and not 
motivating; in the second data extract, when the children forced themselves to stick to the situation in the 
textbook and to relatively fixed characters (and when Minsu forced sartorial choices on poor Mina), the 
game became much more creative, both in a literary and in a linguistic sense.  
Like the rules the game imposed on our learners, none of the recommendations made by the 
reviewers or editors were devised by the author. Nevertheless, some of them we undertook readily and 
willingly. Others we accepted only after our paper was rejected and with the understanding that our voice 
would not be heard unless it could be brought more into harmony with that of the editors. Here, perhaps 
perversely, we do find ourselves in full agreement on the essential inseparability of freedom and will. 
Some forced choices, voluntarily taken and mastered from within, may be immensely fruitful, while others, 
merely submitted to and imposed from afar, are stifling and sterile, and may even strangle the very syntax 
that they purport to promote.   
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